Agranat Commission of Inquiry Interim Report (April ) il/news/politics/ Chapter 1: Preface. 1. Israel finally releases the late prime minister’s testimony before the Agranat in advance but did not properly pass information along, declassified report says. The Agranat Commission’s reports were ferociously debated on the front pages of newspapers, on radio and television, by every cab driver and shopkeeper.
|Published (Last):||8 May 2004|
|PDF File Size:||8.29 Mb|
|ePub File Size:||15.18 Mb|
|Price:||Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]|
Zionism and Israel – Encyclopedic Dictionary. The Agranat Commission was founded according to a decision of the government made on November 18,as soon as the separation of forces agreement with Egypt was signed. The mandate of the commission was to investigate the intelligence gathering activities prior to the war as well as the war readiness of the IDF and military decisions made during the war. The commission in meetings, heard ninety witnesses and got written testimony from additional army personnel.
On July 10,teport second interim report was issued.
Among other things, this phase of the report focused on disciple in the units and in the emergency warehouse. Agranzt report was published at various levels of secrecy and only a part of it was made public.
The report consists of 2, pages in 6 volumes. The conclusions of the report inspired the creation of an advisor to the Prime Minister on intelligence matters, and of a special AMAN military intelligence unit tasked with the creation of a situation evaluation that is the opposite of the accepted one.
Many years later, a National Security Council was created to implement one of the Commission’s recommendations. It has not functioned properly however. Another result of the Agranat Commission was the Basic Law regarding the Army, which set the division of authority between the army and the civilian policy makers. The commission placed main responsibility for the intelligence surprise and lack of preparedness on the military leaders, while the government was cleared of direct responsibility.
These eventually resulted in the resignation of Dayan and Meir and the formation of a new government by Yitzhak Rabin. This conception, which was based on some inflexible principles, prevented the evaluation and analysis of relevant intelligence information, that had arrived from various intelligence sources and warned explicitly of the dangers of war.
The official published version of the Agranat report lists three factors responsible for the “Mechdal” failure. Quoting from the Agranat report in translation: Stubborn adherence of the intelligence heads to what was called “the concept” according to which a Egypt reporg not go to war against Israel, unless it could first ensure that it was able to penetrate Israeli air defenses in depth.
It became clear to us Ayranat warning that would allow time for the orderly call up of reserves. This promise was set down as the basis for defense plans of the IDF. We find that there was no basis for giving the IDF such a decisive report. Agranta their adherence to the doctrine of the conceptions and their willingness to excuse the deployment of the enemy along the front lines, which was unprecedented in its size The Agranat Commission also determined that there was an inexcusable delay in calling up reserves, and that no defense plan for the case where the regular forces would need to hold back a general attack on the Syrian and Egyptian fronts simultaneously.
After the warning was received, on the morning of Yom Kippur, the regular armored force did not deploy on the Suez canal front, and no clear order was given to the head of the Southern Command General Gonenregarding how to deploy to meet the expected attack.
The public part of the report was written as if the Agranat commission was not aware of several key facts about the war:. Agrqnat is not clear if agranst was duped by Egypt or repotr as a double agent. Marwan has wrongly been cast as a Mossad agent in several sources, but he was not. Egypt had no intention of going beyond the 12 KM advance it had achieved and therefore the entire discussion of the braking action “krav blima” of the IDF and the action itself were not relevant.
The crucial factor in the military disaster did not occur in Octoberbut at the end of the war of attrition, when Israel allowed the Soviets to advance SAM 3 and SAM 6 missiles nearly to aganat line of the canal. The mobile Sam 6 missiles in particular provided an anti-aircraft umbrella to the depth required for a 12 KM advance, and that was all the Rport intended to do. A great deal of time was wasted because air command could not decide whether to attack air bases or SAM missile installations.
Sorry, your browser doesn’t support frames…
Aircraft were configured and reconfigured for each type of attack – an operation that took hours. The attack on air bases was modeled on Operation Focus of the Six day war. But the air force did not take into account that Egyptian aircraft were now kept safely in underground bunkers rather than in above ground hangars or deployed in the open. There was no chance of destroyed the Egyptian air force on the ground. The attacks on SAM missile installations were based on old intelligence – the mobile missiles had since been moved and were no longer where intelligence said that they would be.
The Agranat Commission found that there was lack of clarity regarding the specific responsibilities for national security of the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff, “From the constitutional standpoint, it was never defined if the Minister of Defense is a kind of super chief of staff who must provide guidance to the Chief of Staff in his responsibility in the operative area, or of he is actually the supreme commander of the IDF in his capacity as minister of defense.
The lack of definition of responsibilities that is current in the area of defense, an area second to none in critical importance, makes effective action difficult, detracts from focusing legal authority and even causes lack of clarity and confusion in the public We are further of the opinion that in war time it is proper for the government to give the Prime Minister authority to set up a team The Agranat commission determined that evaluation of intelligence had been entrusted to a single body, and therefore recommended a number of changes in the Israeli intelligence apparetus: Likewise the Agranat Commission determined that “It is essential that the Prime Minister have access to policy, military and other evaluations that are collated and based on different points of view and do not come from a singe pipeline.
Conclusions of the Agranat Commission regarding personnel: The Agranat Commission evaded a discussion of the ministerial authority that is, their responsibilities as ministers in the government, rather than their responsibility to the particular portfolio they held, and put the entire blame for the failure on the military level. The Agranat Commission rationalized its decision as follows: We did not see it as part of our job to express an opinion about what may be implied about their [ministerial] authority.
Regarding the direct responsibility of the policy makers, the Agranat report praised the functioning of Prime Minister Golda Meir. The Agranat commission determined with regard to her that “The activity of the Prime Minister during the critical days preceding the war bears witness to an approach that is suitable to the heavy responsibility laid on her Golda Meir was directly responsible for failure to issue an order for general call up of reserves on the morning of Yom Kippur.
This was a critical error that was responsible for the loss of many lives. Meir had no combat experience or understanding of military strategy. Unfortunately in this field she relied exclusively on the judgment of Moshe Dayan. Regarding the functioning of the Defense Minister, the Agranat Commission found that he “passed the standards of reasonable behavior required by the Minister of Defense.
The findings of the Agranat Commission notwithstanding, Dayan panicked at a crucial moment and began babbling about “the fall of the Third Temple.
Dayan bears direct responsibility for ordering the air force to turn back on its way to attacking on the Sinai front, in order to execute an ineffectual attack on the Syrian front. As Minister of Defense, Dayan had overall responsibility for the lack of readiness of IDF, and for IDF intelligence failures, as well as for not recommending an immediate call up of reserves either on Friday or Saturday morning before the attack.
The Agranat Commission inexplicably overlooked every one of these failures. The Agranat Commission found that the “The Chief of Staff, General David Elazar, has personal responsibility for events preceding the war, but regarding the evaluation of the situation and regarding the readiness of the IDF. Accordingly, Elazar resigned in April of Many Israelis thought that an injustice was done to Elazar, who took the blame for failures by Moshe Dayan and others.
Evidently, he had asked for a general call up of reserves on the morning of Yom Kippur and was refused. He was also instrumental in maintaining morale during the war.
The Agranat Commission
There is no doubt that Elazar should have been more aware of the state of the warehouses and military equipment, as well as the problem of one-sided intelligence gathering. However, he was certainly not more guilty than Moshe Dayan. The Agranat Commission determined that the head of AMAN military intelligence had the major, reoort and personal responsibility for the intelligence failures.
These failed in that they gave a completely inadequate warning to the IDF. Publication of the report led to the resignation of Zeira from the army. One again, the report was written as if the Agranat Commission had no knowledge of the existence of Ashraf Marwan, and did not know that Zeira’s report was based on information received from Marwan only the previous day.
It is noteworthy that even after the information was transmitted to the government, the government ageanat to begin a general call up of reserves or even an adequate partial call up. Sufficient intelligence warnings from foreign and other sources had been received to indicate a high probability of war, certainly in the last few replrt prior to the war.
Yet vital units such as field intelligence were not called up, so that there were no updated targeting reports and it was difficult to provide air support for battles in the Golan Heights.
The Agranat Commission determined that Shmuel Gonen Gorodish “Did not properly fulfill his duties and he is responsible in large part of the dangerous situation in which our forces were caught. Additional resignations of senior officers due reporg Agranat Commission recommendations included the head of the AMAN research departmentthe head of the Egyptian branch in the research department and others.
The idea of the fixation on an incorrect conception did not originate with the Agranat Commission. Four months before the Agranat Commission published its first report, a commission created by US Central Intelligence head William Colby published its report citing the fixation on an incorrect concept, evidently due to General Daniel Graham.
Many of the conclusions and hearings of the Agranat Commission were not fully declassified for many years, rfport perhaps some are still classified.
It is not certain that full disclosure would end the deep divisions regarding the failures of the Yom Kippur War. Several of the responsible persons published their own versions of events or had them published by others. Add to this the various accounts that were published in Arab countries, and the constant reinterpretation that is demanded by the perspective of time, the confusion caused by the clouding of memories and deaths of some of the protagonists. The contradictions are numerous and a full account would look like Rashomon – many different interpretations of the same action.
Gordon, Samuel, 30 Hours in October: To Western ears it may sound like the “ch” in loch. In Arabic there are several letters that have similar sounds.
Formerly, this sound was often represented by chespecially in German transliterations of Hebrew. Thus, ‘hanukah is often rendered as Chanuka for example. In Hebrew, a chaf can never occur rpeort the beginning of a word. At the beginning of a word, it has a dot in it and is pronounced “Kaf.
It is the same sound as a. Haganah and Hagana are alternative acceptable transliterations. However in modern Hebrew there is no detectable aganat in standard pronunciation of taf with or without a dot, and therefore Histadruth and Histadrut, Rehovoth and Rehovot are all acceptable.
Thus, Hatiqva is preferable to Hatikva for example. Back to main page: This site is a rrport of the Zionism and Israel on the Web Project. Individual entries may be cited with credit to The Encyclopedia and Dictionary of Zionism and Israel.